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DEMAND-DRIVEN TECHNICAL CHANGE AND
PRODUCTIVITY GROWTH: THEORY AND
EVIDENCE FROM THE ENERGY POLICY ACT∗
Giammario Impullitti† Richard Kneller‡ Danny McGowan§
We present novel evidence on the effect of market size on technology adoption and productivity. Our tests
exploit a natural experiment in the US corn industry where changes to national energy policy created exogenous
increases in demand. Difference-in-difference estimates show that the demand shock caused technical change
as corn producers adopted higher quality seeds which in turn raised productivity by 7%. We develop a simple
model that formalizes the mechanisms underlying our results.
I. INTRODUCTION
NEW TECHNOLOGIES ARE A KEY ENGINE of productivity growth. While changes in firms’ technology
mix are often based on cost considerations, economists have recognized since at least Schmookler [1954] that
the incentive to adopt productivity-enhancing technologies also depends on demand conditions. The size of the
market is essential in shaping the decision to introduce or adopt new technologies.
In this paper, we present novel evidence that demand shocks provoke productivity improvements by inducing
technology adoption. Much of our understanding about the relationship between market size and productivity
comes from the pharmaceutical industry (Acemoglu and Linn [2004]; Dubois et al. [2011]; Blume-Kohout
and Sood [2013]). These studies find that market size promotes innovation, although with differently sized
elasticities. The evidence presented in this paper supports this work, albeit for an industry where innovation is
quite different. Innovation within the pharmaceutical sector is characterized by very expensive and very long
innovation cycles, protected by strict legal protections. However, firms in many sectors of the economy rely on
innovations by outside firms. The evidence we provide is for the adoption of an existing technology. Technology
adoptions of this type are arguably, more likely to be prevalent in the wider economy, and responsive to smaller
aggregate demand shocks.
Our tests revolve around a natural experiment in the US corn industry. The Energy Policy Act of 2005 (EP
Act) mandated an increase in the ethanol content of gasoline which sparked a wave of ethanol plant openings
that raised demand for corn, the key intermediate input in ethanol production. The key driving force behind
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the legislation were fears among national policymakers that the US economy was vulnerable to interruption of
overseas energy supplies. The EP Act sought to improve energy independence and security through an array of
measures including increased use of ethanol in gasoline (Diggs [2012]). Neither productivity nor technological
considerations within the corn industry motivated the EP Act and there is no evidence of lobbying activity
preceding the legislation, by either corn or seed producers.1 To establish causality we exploit the fact that the EP
Act had no effect on demand for wheat which is produced in the same locations as corn, uses similar production
processes but is not used to manufacture ethanol.
Given our focus on established producers, we use difference-in-difference estimations that compare the
evolution of physical productivity measures within the corn industry with wheat productivity in the same Mid-
western county. We use crop yields (the number of bushels produced per acre), the standard measure of physical
productivity in the agricultural sector and, in addition, we construct physical total factor productivity (TFPQ)
which measures output using physical quantities and accounts for input usage, including seed expenditures.2
Unlike other approaches that use revenue and industry-level price deflators to measure output, our productivity
measures do not capture confounding price effects or adjustments to market power that may make firms appear
more productive even if underlying technical efficiency is unchanged. Rather, we exclusively study how the
changes in demand affected technical efficiency.
Our estimates show that the demand shock caused a statistically significant increase in productivity among
the treatment group relative to the implied counterfactual. Economically, the average treatment effect (ATE)
equates to a 7% increase in yield per acre. In addition, we find a statistically significant 0.8% increase in TFPQ,
indicating that the productivity gains do not simply capture adjustments to input usage. In fact, further tests
show that the demand shock had no effect on the per acre quantity of capital, labor, fertilizer, seed or other
intermediate inputs.3
Subsequent tests show that the productivity improvements are driven by technology adoption. Following the
demand shock, corn producers rapidly adopted a new seed, stacked-variety corn seeds (SV seeds henceforth),
that had been commercially available for several years but were seldom used. These represented an upgrading in
the quality of inputs because they blend existing pest tolerance (Bt) and herbicide tolerance (Ht) genes into a
single variety. Stacked-variety seeds produce more bushels per acre relative to single-gene (Bt or Ht) seed types
by allowing the crop to get closer to its yield potential. However, farmers incur fixed costs when adopting SV
seeds due to search costs, changes in production methods, and learning how to use different machinery (Vyn
[2010], Fernandez-Cornejo et al. [2018]).
We find the adoption of SV seeds caused a significant increase in productivity within the corn industry. A
10% increase in the SV technology leads to a 0.7% productivity gain. By the end of the sample period SV
seeds account for approximately 50% of planted acres, indicating they account for the majority of the observed
productivity gains. Our findings on the link between the adoption of new seeds and productivity growth echo the
results in Bustos et al. [2016], who study the introduction of genetically engineered seeds in Brazil which raised
labor productivity.
Technology adoption and productivity improvements could derive from supply-side forces. For example, if
the cost of SV seeds falls through time producers may adopt the more productive technology irrespective of
demand conditions. The data decisively refute this view. First, there is no reduction in the per acre cost of SV
seed during the sample period. Rather, stacked-variety seeds are more costly compared to single-gene seeds
and this relative price difference actually grew through time. Second, falsification tests show no evidence of
1The plausible exogeneity of the demand shock is also reflected in a series of tests that examine the determinants of
ethanol plant location. The location of ethanol plants were chosen strategically to minimize corn procurement costs (they
located away from existing ethanol plants to avoid competition) and maximize revenue. We are able to show that their
location was orthogonal to productivity in the corn sector, a result previously confirmed by McAloon et al. [2000] and
Sarmiento et al. [2012].
2Foster et al. [2008] note that comparisons of TFPQ are more meaningful when variations in quality are small. This
argument would appear to be relevant in the case of corn.
3Evidence from the agricultural literature suggests that these additional TFP effects arose because of other complemen-
tary changes to farming practices, in particular to tilage.
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significant productivity increases among Texan corn producers that were unaffected by the ethanol demand
shock. Operating practices, seed availability and seed prices are similar in the Corn Belt and Texas. However,
their location far from ethanol plants and the high associated transport costs meant that the ethanol boom did not
affect demand for Texan corn. If reductions in technology costs undergird our main results we should uncover
productivity gains among corn producers in these regions of similar magnitude compared to in the Corn Belt.
This is not the case.
Productivity could increase for other reasons. Such confounds include shocks to other sources of demand,
climactic conditions during the growing season, changes in financial constraints and spillover effects on the
control group. We explore these alternative mechanisms but find little support for them in the data. Moreover,
our estimations include county-year fixed effects which rule out time-varying productivity and technological
shocks common to both groups at the local and macro levels. This approach has the attractive property that the
ATE is identified through comparisons of the treatment and control group within the same county-year.
We construct a simple model to provide a framework to interpret these results. An industry is composed
of firms that are heterogeneous in productivity producing varieties of the same product. Since the adoption
of SV seeds leads to a reduction in labor per unit of output, following Bustos et al. [2016] we characterize it
as as labor-augmenting technical change. Each firm has the option to operate with its current technology or
pay a fixed cost to adopt a superior, more productive technology. Due to the adoption cost, only a few highly
productive firms can pay it and upgrade to the new technology. A larger market size leads to a higher share of
firms adopting the more efficient technology. Hence, demand pull shocks generate increases in firms’ revenues
which stimulates technology adoption and productivity growth.
Our research is important for three reasons. The corn industry accounts for a large share of US agricultural
employment and approximately 30% of agricultural output. Understanding the drivers of corn productivity
dynamics therefore matters for the agricultural sector. Moreover, evidence from this industry are likely to
generalize to other settings. Corn producers rely on off-the-shelf technologies created by external firms. This is
similar to the situation in many industries where R&D expenditure is concentrated within a select few companies.
Our laboratory also allows us to exclusively study the effects of demand on productivity and shutdown the
confounding competition channel that is present in studies assessing the effects of market size due to trade
liberalization.
I(i). Literature Review
Our paper is related to several strands of literature. Market size is often viewed as an important determinant of
productivity-enhancing investments such as innovation and technology adoption. Increases in actual or potential
market size generate profit incentives that pull firms into technological advances. Acemoglu and Linn [2004]
formalize these ideas in a model of innovation where current and future market size shape the direction of
innovation. Similarly, market size and profit incentives play a central role in most growth models featuring
endogenous R&D-driven technological progress (e.g. Romer [1990], Grossman and Helpman [1991], Aghion
and Howitt [1992]) and in models of technology adoption (e.g. Parente and Prescott [1999]).
The link between market size, technological change and productivity has also been at the center of the recent
literature on trade and firm heterogeneity. Our model contains insights from Yeaple [2005] and Bustos [2011],
where heterogeneous firms select into technology upgrading following increases in market size brought about
by trade liberalization. Recent models of trade and innovation embed both extensive and intensive margins
of productivity growth in response to larger market size (Dhingra [2012], Impullitti and Licandro [2017], and
Impullitti et al. [2017]).
Early studies by Schmookler [1954] and Griliches [1957] identified market size effects as a key force behind
new inventions and technology adoption. Similarly, Jaffe [1988] and Cohen and Klepper [1996] find a positive
link between firm size and R&D intensity. In his summary of the available empirical evidence, Cohen [2010]
argues that demand-pull theories do not typically survive empirical scrutiny however, in part because they often
ignore important industry characteristics, use imperfect proxies for demand and lack compelling strategies to
deal with issues of endogeneity.
A large empirical macro and trade literature studies the effects of market size on technological change.
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Owing to difficulties in establishing causality in macro settings, a more common approach in recent years has
been to use micro data and specific policy induced liberalization events. For example, Bustos [2011] shows that
the introduction of MERCOSUR, a large regional trade agreement, had a strong impact on several measures
of technical change at the firm level, including R&D, spending on technology transfers, and capital goods that
embody new technologies. She finds that increases in revenue generated by tariff reductions lead exporters to
innovate. Lileeva and Trefler [2010] show that Canadian firms which experienced an increase in market size
following the Canada-US Free Trade Agreement raised their labor productivity by investing in innovation and
adopting new technologies. Griffith et al. [2010] find that the EU Single Market Programme (SMP), which
deregulated the product market, is associated with increased product market competition and with increases in
innovation and productivity growth. While these papers emphasize the importance of increased market potential
in driving this change, trade liberalization typically occurs simultaneously with changes in competition. This
point is made by Aghion et al. [2017] who analyze the effects of demand shocks generated by exports on French
firms’ innovation decisions. They find evidence of a market size effect of exports on innovation, which can
be offset by increased competition on innovation effort. In our setting, tariffs on ethanol are high and do not
change, acting as a barrier to import competition. In addition, in an industry characterized by a few large firms
with high sunk costs, such as corn, the entry margin is not likely to be strong and we should not expect large
pro-competitive effects of changes in demand. This allows for a better identification of the market size effects of
a demand shock.
The paper is organized as follows. In the next section we outline a theoretical model to help interpret the
empirical results. We describe the data set in Section III. Section IV provides an overview of the corn and ethanol
industries and the key legislative changes that motivate our empirical framework. We outline our identification
strategy and provide the main results in Section V. Section VI contains an exhaustive set of robustness tests.
Conclusions are drawn in Section VII.
II. A SIMPLE MODEL
We devise a simple model of technology adoption to highlight some key economic mechanisms which help inter-
pret our empirical findings. As we detail below, there exists a high degree of heterogeneity in size and productivity
across corn producers in different counties. We therefore outline a model where firms differ along these margins.4
II(i). Economic Environment
Corn is produced in many substitutable varieties by a continuum of monopolistically competitive firms.5 Each
variety j is produced by a firm with a productivity z˜ drawn from a Pareto distribution F (z˜) with shape k and
location z˜min.6 After observing productivity, firms decide whether or not to enter and produce. After entering,
firms can produce output with technology
l j =
x j
z˜ j
, (1)
where l represents the labor resources needed to produce quantity x of variety j. Alternatively, the firm can
upgrade its technology by paying a fixed adoption cost λ > 0. The upgraded technology is
l j =
x j
γ˜ z˜ j
+λ , (2)
where γ˜ > 1. Hence, once a firm has observed its productivity draw, z˜, it can decide whether to operate at zero
fixed cost and a higher variable cost, or to upgrade to a technology with a positive fixed cost and a lower variable
4Although we do not have firm-level data, the fact that land quality varies little across space suggests the presence of
substantial firm heterogeneity across corn producers.
5The monopolistic competition assumption is not necessary for the results, which would hold also in a perfectly
competitive economy with heterogeneous firms as in Hopenhayn [1992].
6While our simple model solely aims at providing economic intuition, a direct map with the empirical analysis could be
made by assuming that all firms within a county have the same productivity.
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cost. This formulation of the adoption problem is motivated by evidence that the shift to SV seeds imposes
substantial fixed costs upon producers. For example, producers must learn how to use new production practices
and machinery, and incur search costs finding the SV seeds most suited to local growing conditions (Vyn [2010],
Fernandez-Cornejo et al. [2018]).
II(ii). Equilibrium
We outline a partial equilibrium model assuming that wages are given and normalized to 1, and that each variety
faces inverse demand
p j = Dˆxα−1j , (3)
with α ∈ (0,1), where Dˆ is an exogenous demand shifter determining the market size of each firm.
In equilibrium each firm produces one variety. We therefore drop the j subscripts and indicate varieties
with their productivity z˜. Firm profit maximization leads to the standard optimal pricing pl(z˜) = 1/α z˜ and
ph(z˜) = 1/αγ˜ z˜, where i = l,h indicates whether the firm produces with the low or high variable cost technology
after entry. Profits from using the two technologies are
pil (z˜) =
(
pl(z˜)− 1z˜
)
xl(z˜) = αˆDˆz, (4)
pih (z˜) =
(
ph(z˜)− 1γ˜ z˜
)
xh(z˜) = αˆDˆγz−λ , (5)
where z = z˜
α
1−α , γ = γ˜
α
1−α , αˆ = (1−α)α α1−α and Dˆ = D 11−α . A firm with productivity z˜ upgrades its technology
if pil (z˜)≤ pih (z˜), hence the firm for which this condition holds with equality determines the technology adoption,
or upgrading cutoff, z∗h. The cutoff condition is
z∗h =
λ
αˆ (γ−1) Dˆ . (AC)
An increase in demand for any variety of corn, i.e. a increase in Dˆ, reduces the adoption cutoff, z∗h. The
economic intuition is straightforward: a surge in demand increases the size of the market for each firm, thereby
allowing more firms to cover the fixed cost of adopting the superior technology. Average industry productivity is
z¯ =
∫ z∗h
zmin
z f (z)dz+ γ
∫ ∞
z∗h
z f (z)dz,=
κzmin
κ−1
[
1+(γ−1)
(
z∗h
zmin
)1−κ]
,
where f (z) = κzkmz−κ−1 is the productivity density function. It is easy to see that as larger share of firms adopt
the new technology, the industry as a whole becomes more productive. Our simple model therefore predicts
an increase in adoption of the more productive technology and an increase in average productivity following a
positive demand shock. Notice that, a reduction in the adoption cutoff can also be generated by a reduction in
the adoption cost, λ .7
II(iii). Discussion
The model can also be used to ask whether the observed increase in productivity could be the result of more
intensive use of a fixed input rather than the adoption of a more productive input. Abstracting from technology
adoption, the expansion of market size, Dˆ, could increase a revenue-based measure of productivity but not the
7Our empirical findings strongly refute the possibility that the adoption choice is generated by this supply-side channel.
For example, Table A.1 shows no decrease in the cost of SV seeds during the sample period. Moreover, Figure 5 shows a
strong positive correlation between the rate of SV adoption and ethanol capacity, a proxy for market size.
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physical/technological productivity which is the focus of our empirical analysis. Revenue-based productivity for
firm z˜ that adopts the new technology is computed as revenues over total costs,
ph(z˜)xh(z˜)
xh(z˜)
z˜ +λ
=
1
α+ λ
α
1
1−α Dˆγz
.
Increasing a firm’s market size, through an increase in demand Dˆ reduces the incidence of the fixed cost, thereby
increasing the firm’s revenue-based productivity. Our key empirical results below, however, show that the
demand shock increases physical productivity (yields and TFPQ). This implies that the observed increase in
efficiency cannot be due to economies of scale coming from the more intensive use of a fixed input.
Finally, the increase in aggregate productivity in the corn industry observed in the data could be the result of
a selection effect which forces the less productive firms out of the market. In Appendix C we show that selection
effects do not play a role for observed increases in productivity. It is still useful to analyse this effect in the
model. Let us assume that all firms have to pay a fixed operating cost, λp. Now the adoption cutoff is determined
by z∗h = (λ +λp)/
(
αˆ (γ−1) Dˆ), but there is also a survival cutoff z∗ below which non-adopting firms will not
break even z∗ = λp/αˆDˆ. It is easy to see that an increase in demand Dˆ decreases the survival cutoff z∗: larger
market size makes survival easier. Aggregate sectoral productivity becomes
z¯ =
∫ z∗h
z∗
z f (z)dz+ γ
∫ ∞
z∗h
z f (z)dz,=
κz∗
κ−1
[
1+(γ−1)
(
z∗h
z∗
)1−κ]
,
where a reduction in the survival cutoff reduces aggregate productivity, thereby offsetting the positive effect of
technology adoption on productivity. In our simple model, the negative selection effect indeed dominates and
an increase in demand leads to a reduction in aggregate productivity. Using the two cutoff conditions we get
z∗h = z
∗(λp +λ )/λp(γˆ−1), so aggregate productivity is increasing in the survival cutoff z∗ and decreasing in the
exogenous demand component.8 Hence, this provides further theoretical support to our empirical hypothesis that
technology adoption is the key force behind the increase in productivity in the corn industry.
III. DATA
We retrieve productivity data from the National Agricultural Statistics Service (NASS) - the statistics branch
of the United States Department for Agriculture (USDA). As part its mission, the NASS collects information
on crop yields (bushels per acre), the dominant measure of productivity within agriculture, in industry i in
county c during year t. We therefore have annual productivity data for the corn and wheat industries within
each county-industry over the period 2000 to 2007. In total the sample contains 12,344 observations, drawn
from 843 counties located in the 12 states that form the Corn Belt.9 The decision to restrict the sample to the
Corn Belt is predicated on the fact that both the corn and ethanol industries are geographically concentrated
in the region: 88% of national corn and 93% of ethanol production takes place there. Further information on
acres planted, the number of firms per acre and irrigation (the ratio of irrigated acreage to total acres) for each
county-industry-year is taken from the NASS.
In the empirical analysis we also use physical total factor productivity (TFPQ) which accounts for input use
and measures output in physical quantities (bushels per acre in this case). A key advantage of both the yield and
TFPQ variables is that changes in productivity cannot be driven by price shocks, market power, factor market
distortions or changes in the product mix which frequently contaminate productivity estimates when revenue is
used to measure output and firm-level price data are unavailable.
8In a more general model where an increase in market size can generate an increase in the wages of the workers in the
industry, the result would be less stark, as higher wages would push the survival cutoff in the opposite direction.
9The 12 states in the sample are Illinois, Indiana, Iowa, Kansas, Michigan, Minnesota, Missouri, Nebraska, North
Dakota, Ohio, South Dakota and Wisconsin.
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One constraint we face in constructing TFPQ in the corn and wheat industries is that the NASS does not
release data on capital stocks, labor, material, and energy inputs at the county-industry level. However, annual
state-industry level information is available from the ERS Agricultural Resource Management Survey (ARMS).
Following Foster et al. [2008], TFPQ is constructed using the typical index form
t f pist = yist −αkkist −αllist −αmmict −αeeist , (6)
where i, s and t denote industry, state and year, respectively; the lower-case letters indicate the natural logarithm of
output, capital stock, labor hours, material inputs, and energy inputs; and α j ( j∈ (k, l,m,e)) are the corresponding
factor elasticities. All inputs and output are measured per acre. Labor inputs are measured in hours, capital as
the value of machinery services used, and material inputs are the sum of expenditures on fertilizer, lime, seeds,
herbicide and insecticide.
We deflate capital, material, and the other inputs into 2000 values using their respective NASS input price
index. That is, we have a separate price index for each input. Recent work by De Loecker et al. [2016] highlights
the problem of unobserved input prices in the context of productivity estimation and the associated difficulty in
identifying the underlying drivers of productivity growth. By using input-specific price indexes we overcome
these issues. To construct the labor, material, and energy input elasticities, we use industries’ average cost shares
over our sample. Capital cost shares are measured as the capital stock (the sum of farm equipment, land and
buildings) multiplied by the capital rental rates reported by Duffy [2010].
Information on technology adoption is also taken from the ARMS database. This source provides annual
data on the share of corn acres planted using SV seeds (the ratio of corn acres planted with SV seeds to total
corn acres) for each state from 2000 onward. Corn producers have access to two types of corn seed. Single-gene
varieties are GE seeds that contain genetic traits that either protect the plant from herbicide poisoning or pests
(Ht or Bt). SV seeds combine both traits. Experimental trials have consistently shown SV seeds to produce
higher yields per acre by preventing destruction of the crop. However, SV seeds typically retail at a premium to
single-gene seeds as shown in Appendix Table A.1. Both types of seed were commercially available throughout
the sample period. In contrast, wheat producers only have access to single-gene variety seeds. SV wheat seeds
have not yet been developed.
We match the productivity and technology adoption data to information on the ethanol industry taken
from The Ethanol Industry Outlook, an annual industry journal published by the Renewable Fuels Association.
This contains annual plant-level data on the owner, capacity (operating and under construction), location, and
feedstock of every ethanol plant in the US. We aggregate the plant-level data to the county level. We include
only plants that use corn as a feedstock on the grounds that others are irrelevant to corn producers.
[INSERT TABLE I AROUND HERE]
The remaining variables used in the econometric analysis are listed in Table I. This includes various types of
input usage (ARMS), precipitation and extreme temperature, measured as the share of days with temperatures
above the 90th percentile over the growing season (Weather Underground).10 A complete description of each
variable is provided in Appendix A.
IV. OVERVIEW OF THE CORN AND ETHANOL INDUSTRIES AND LEGISLATIVE CHANGES
In this section we outline important details regarding the production and distribution of ethanol, as well as the
key reforms to US energy policy that sparked the ethanol boom.
IV(i). The Ethanol Production and Distribution Process
Ethanol is a clean-burning, high-octane motor fuel. Almost all ethanol is derived from starch- and sugar-based
10We match each county to the nearest weather station because not all counties contain a weather station.
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feedstocks. The ease with which these sugars can be extracted from corn makes it the preferred feedstock
of large-scale, commercial ethanol producers (USDE [2013]).11 The production process involves converting
starch-based crops into ethanol either by dry- or wet-mill processing. More than 80% of ethanol plants in the US
are dry mills due to lower capital costs (McAloon et al. [2000], USDE [2012]). During the dry-milling process
the corn kernel is ground into flour and subsequently fermented to make ethanol. By-products of this process
include distillers dry grains (DDGs), which can be sold as animal feed. Wet-mill plants steep corn in a dilute
sulfuric acid solution in order to separate the starch, protein, and fiber content. The corn starch component can
then be fermented into ethanol through a process similar to that used in dry milling, while the steep water is sold
as a livestock feed ingredient.
Corn accounts for approximately 60% of ethanol production costs, with the remainder attributable to natural
gas (15%), other variable costs (12%), and fixed costs (13%) (Hofstrand [2013]). The distribution process entails
shipping harvested corn from farms and co-ops to ethanol plants using lorries which are the low-cost transport
option (McNew and Griffiths [2005], Fatal [2011]). Tanker trucks and rail cars are subsequently used to transport
manufactured ethanol to a terminal for blending. The blended gasoline is then distributed to gasoline retailers or
stored.
IV(ii). Legislative Changes
The origins of the ethanol boom lie in a series of political issues that culminated in the 2005 EP Act. During the
early 2000s a perception grew within national policymaking circles that the US economy was overly reliant on
foreign energy supplies that were vulnerable to interruption (Diggs [2012]). In response to these pressures, the
EP Act aimed to improve national energy independence and security by stimulating various forms of domestic
energy production. Part of this legislative agenda sought to displace crude oil imports and reduce reliance on
foreign energy sources by promoting greater use of ethanol in gasoline. The EP Act mandated a rise in the
ethanol content of gasoline from 4 billion gallons in 2006 to 7.5 billion in 2012. In addition, the EP Act set
a target, known as the Renewable Fuel Standard (RFS), that a minimum 10% of gasoline should be made-up
of ethanol in future.12 The subsequent Energy Independence and Security Act of 2007 set yet higher targets,
mandating a minimum 36 billion gallon ethanol content by 2022.
IV(iii). The Ethanol Boom
The volumetric ethanol production targets and the RFS guaranteed ethanol demand. Ethanol producers also
benefited from a 51 cent per gallon tax credit paid through the Volumetric Ethanol Excise Tax Credit (VEETC),
and were shielded from competition with foreign ethanol producers by an import tariff of $143/m3 levied on
imported ethanol.13 Because vehicles did not require engine modifications to run on blended ethanol, most
gasoline retailers throughout the US began to offer E10, a fuel mixture of 10% ethanol and 90% gasoline.
Automobile manufacturers also promoted blended gasoline by introducing car engines capable of running on E15
and E85.14 Following successful engine performance tests, the US Environmental Protection Agency authorized
the use of blended gasoline in all motorcycles, heavy-duty vehicles, and non-road engines.
[INSERT TABLE II AROUND HERE]
Online Appendix Figure A.1 illustrates the wave of investment in new ethanol plants, and the geographical
concentration of entry on the Corn Belt. Entrants account for 76% of capacity expansion during the sample
11According to USDE [2013] over 90% of US ethanol production relies on corn as a feedstock. Owing to differences in
their chemical properties, multiple feedstocks cannot be mixed together during production. None of the ethanol plants in
our sample use wheat as a feedstock.
12The USDA Feed Grains Database reports that by 2009 the ethanol market share of the US gasoline industry had
reached 8% as a result of the energy legislation.
13The VEETC was created under the American Jobs Creation Act of 2004. It was renewed as part of the Farm Bill of
2008 at a lower rate of $0.45 per gallon of ethanol blended with gasoline.
14Sales of e85-engine vehicles account for between 33% and 40% of annual auto sales during the sample period. In
2000 approximately 2.2 million e85 vehicles were sold compared to 2.8 million in 2007.
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period. Table II provides further detail on these patterns. Between 2002 and 2007 the number of ethanol plants
increased from 56 to 151 and capacity increased by almost 225%. Much of this entry occurred in the two years
after implementation of the EP Act when the net entry rate spiked to 32% and 41%. The average plant operating
capacity is 56 million gallons per year (mgy) and there is an upward trend in this average (48 mgy in 2002 versus
57 mgy in 2007), reflecting the entry of larger plants and capacity expansions.15
[INSERT FIGURE 1 AROUND HERE]
Figure 1 documents the increasing importance of the ethanol sector as a source of the demand for corn fol-
lowing enactment of the EP Act. During the years prior to 2005 approximately 11% of national corn production
was used to manufacture ethanol. Following the expansion of ethanol production capacity this value steadily
increased to 25% by 2007 and 40% in 2010. In addition, Appendix Figure A.3 shows that the increase in ethanol
demand did not displace other sources of corn demand such that demand for corn was strictly higher after 2005.
V. EMPIRICAL METHODOLOGY AND RESULTS
V(i). Identification Strategy
Isolating causality revolves around a difference-in-difference estimation strategy. We estimate the equation
yict = αic +βCornic ∗Postt +δXict + γct + εict , (7)
where yict is an outcome variable (productivity or TFPQ) in industry i in region c (either a county or state) at time
t; Cornic is a dummy variable equal to 1 if the observation is from the corn industry, 0 otherwise. We measure
demand using the standard difference-in-difference dummy variable, Postt , which is equal to 1 for the years
2005-2007 when the EP Act is in force, 0 otherwise. We also experiment with a continuous demand measure,
ethanol capacity, which captures ethanol production capacity within 200 miles of the county. The choice of 200
miles is based on estimates from the agricultural economics literature, which suggests that ethanol producers
procure corn from farms within this range to ensure timeliness of supply, and because ethanol manufacturers
bear the transport expenses, to minimize shipping costs (Hofstrand [2013], McAloon et al. [2000], Sarmiento et
al. [2012], USDE [2013]).
The regressions include a vector of control variables, Xict , while εict is the error term. We also include a
set of region-year (γct) and region-industry (αic) dummy variables to eliminate unobserved heterogeneity. In
the yield (TFPQ) tests the region is defined as a county (state). Region-year effects capture all time-varying
productivity determinants that are common to both groups and coincide with treatment (such as climatic shocks
or adjustments to tax rates). This tight focus provides an ideal estimating environment because the ATE is
identified through cross-industry variation within the region-year dimension of the data. To purge time-invariant
productivity determinants that are region-specific, but differentially affect the dependent variable within the
treatment and control groups, we include region-industry effects. We cluster the standard errors at the region
level in line with Bertrand et al. [2004].
Central to this approach is establishing an implied counterfactual. We choose the wheat industry because it
is ubiquitous throughout the Corn Belt, uses similar production process as corn and is planted and harvested
at the same time as corn meaning it is subject to similar climactic conditions over the growing season. Wheat,
like corn, can in principle be used to produce ethanol. However, this use is very small in the aggregate, wheat
not used as an input by the ethanol producers in our sample and there is evidence that converting ethanol plants
to use wheat as a feedstock is unlikely. According to the Environmental Protection Agency, 0.4% of total US
ethanol production is made from wheat and milo grains. Industry sources state that US ethanol producers do not
switch to using wheat for ethanol owing to 1) the process of retrofitting plants to grind wheat instead of corn is
153.5 billion gallons of ethanol were contained in gasoline in 2004, compared to 13.3 billion gallons in 2010. Appendix
Figure A.2 shows that the market share of ethanol imports is close to 0 in all years.
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costly, 2) ethanol yields from wheat are 20-30% lower compared to the same weight of corn, and 3) wheat does
not produce the distillers dry grains that are sold by ethanol producers as an additional source of revenue.
The key identifying assumption underlying our tests is the parallel trends assumption. Figure 2 plots
productivity in the corn and wheat industries during the sample period. Before 2005, productivity evolves in a
very similar way within both industries. The parallel trends assumption therefore holds. However, after 2005
productivity in the corn industry begins to increase whereas wheat productivity does not.
[INSERT TABLE 3 AROUND HERE] [INSERT FIGURE 2 AROUND HERE]
Difference-in-difference estimates are more convincing where the treatment and control groups are similar
ex ante. We therefore use t-tests to examine the similarity of the production process (measured using inputs per
acre) during the pre-treatment period. Table III shows we cannot reject the null of equality in the per acre value
of land and buildings, machinery, labor, fertilizer and seed inputs. Together these pieces of evidence suggest that
wheat is a valid counterfactual.16
V(ii). Econometric Results
Before reporting formal empirical tests of the demand-productivity relationship, we provide some descriptive
evidence on the suggestive patterns within the raw data. In Figure 3 we compare the productivity distribution in
2000 to the situation in 2007 when the demand shock has taken effect. There is a clear unambiguous increase in
average industry productivity with a large rightward shift in the survival productivity threshold.17 In contrast,
Figure 4 shows wheat productivity did not respond to the demand shock. Appendix Figure A.5 provides clear
evidence across all states in the sample that the passing of the EP Act coincides with the steep section of
the familiar S-shaped technology adoption function. The evidence reported in Figure 5 affirms that demand
conditions lie at the heart of our findings. Specifically, the figure illustrates that technology adoption is positively
correlated with increases in local ethanol capacity, a strong proxy for demand.18
[INSERT FIGURE 3 AROUND HERE] [INSERT FIGURE 4 AROUND HERE]
Turning to econometric methods, Table IV reports estimates of equation (7) that provide evidence that
the demand shock caused a significant increase in productivity within the corn industry. Column 1 of Table
IV reports estimates from a simple difference-in-difference model based on equation (7) without any control
variables. The effect is economically meaningful and highly statistically significant. The ATE is estimated to be
equivalent to a 7.6% increase in productivity.
In column 2 of Table IV we add as controls the number of acres planted, the incidence of irrigation
technologies and the number of operating firms. The number of acres planted captures the possible effects of
increasing or decreasing returns to scale. For example, farmers may make productivity investments following the
demand shock but they might also cultivate increasingly marginal land which would tend to attenuate the ATE.
16An implicit identifying assumption is that when deciding on where to plant corn and wheat, farmers do not switch wheat
to inferior land to make way for corn. If this assumption fails, then the productivity of wheat may fall. We cannot definitively
rule out this possibility. However, two pieces of evidence suggest this was not the case and wheat productivity was similar
before and after the EP Act. First, Figure 4 shows a high degree of overlap in the distribution of wheat productivity in 2000
and 2007. Second, using data from the wheat industry we estimated the equation yieldct = αPost2005t +βXct + γc + εct ,
where yieldct is the natural logarithm of wheat productivity in county c during year t, Post2005t is a dummy variable equal
to 1 for the years 2005, 2006 and 2007, 0 otherwise, Xct is the vector of controls, γc denote county fixed effects, and εct is
the error term. β indicates the change in wheat productivity between the pre- and post-EP Act periods within counties.
We estimate β to be 0.0111 (t-statistic = 1.09). The insignificant coefficient suggests there was little change in wheat
productivity between the periods.
17Figure A.4 in the Appendix reports the distribution of productivity in 2000 and 2007 taking into account year effects.
This ensures that the patterns in the data do not simply represent trends towards higher productivity through time. The
evolution of productivity is very similar.
18The correlation is also highly statistically significant. Correlation = 0.40 (p-value = 0.00).
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We find that the correlation is both negative and statistically significant. The irrigation coefficient is estimated to
be statistically insignificant. The number of firms per acre captures competitive effects. Consistent with this
intuition we find a 10% increase in the number of firms is associated with a 0.47% increase in yield. The addition
of these controls does little to alter the estimated effect of the EP Act on yield per acre.
[INSERT TABLE IV AROUND HERE] [INSERT FIGURE 5 AROUND HERE]
Central to the empirical strategy is the claim that the demand shock was due to the expansion of the ethanol
industry. To verify that changes in market size drive our inferences, we interact the corn dummy variable with
the ethanol capacity variable.19 The estimates in column 3 of Table IV show that a 10% increase in local ethanol
capacity causes a 0.5% increase in corn productivity. Considering ethanol operating capacity for the average
county increased from 455 mgy in 2004 to 1,040 mgy in 2007, the estimates imply demand from the ethanol
industry provoked an 11.9% productivity increase.20
In columns 4 and 5 of Table IV we present evidence from regressions in which TFPQ is the dependent
variable in equation (7). Here we find that the demand shock had a smaller effect, an increase of 0.78%.
The smaller TFPQ response relative to the increase in yield found elsewhere in the table is consistent with
the argument above that when we account for the increase in seed expenditure when calculating TFPQ, the
improvement in TFPQ is small because SV seeds are more expensive than single-gene seeds. The agricultural
economics literature discusses other sources of productivity gains that have followed from experience in using
SV seeds. Of some importance appear to have been reduced tillage requirements. Reductions in the number of
times farmers needed to till the soil led to reduced fertilizer run-off, lower gasoline costs, and higher TFPQ.
The remaining columns in Table IV tie the observed productivity gains to the adoption of SV seed. We first
approach this question by including an interaction between the corn dummy variable and the share of acres
planted with SV seed in equation (7). The estimates in column 6 show a significant positive relationship between
the adoption of SV seeds and productivity within the corn industry. A 10% increase in the incidence of SV seed
is estimated to increase corn productivity by 0.93%.
Intuitively, one would anticipate the effects of the SV seed technology to be more pronounced among corn
producers where adoption rates are highest. We therefore estimate a triple-difference model
yict = αic +β1Cornic ∗Postt +β2Cornic ∗SV seedct +β3Cornic ∗Postt ∗SV seedct +δXict + γct + εict , (8)
where all variables are defined as before except SV seedct which is the share of acres planted with SV seed in
each state-year.
The results of equation (8) are reported in column 7 of Table IV. The Corn-Post interaction coefficient
remains positive and statistically significant but is economically smaller compared to previous specifications.
However, this is consistent with the Corn-SV seed and Corn-Post-SV seed interactions that are highly statistically
significant and economically important. In essence, the post 2005 increase in corn productivity is driven by
technology adoption. The triple interaction coefficient indicates that within the corn industry, productivity
increased relatively more post 2005 in areas that adopted the SV seed technology to a greater extent.21 Hence,
19Evidence indicates that, because ethanol plants were primarily located in the Corn Belt, the increase in the number of
acres of corn that were planted within each county was economically small. Fatal [2011] finds a positive effect on corn
acreage up to 286 miles from ethanol plants. He estimates that a new 100 mgy ethanol plant increased corn acreage by
just 0.52%, and that the increase in a county’s acreage of corn that occurred would supply just 0.21% of the total ethanol
capacity of the new ethanol plant. For producers close to new ethanol plants the incentive was to make existing land more
productive rather than convert acreage to growing corn.
20This finding is robust to defining the local market using a 100 mile radius.
21USDA field trials show that stacked-variety corn seeds produce 171 bushels per acre versus 134 for single-gene seeds.
By the end of our sample period stacked varieties accounted for approximately 25% of acres planted. This implies a
productivity increase of 9.25 bushels per acre. Consistent with this, the 7% ATE we estimate is equivalent to a 9.38 bushel
per acre increase in productivity.
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adoption of the new technology underlies the productivity gains we observe following the demand shock.22
VI. THREATS TO IDENTIFICATION
Before concluding that demand shocks improve productivity causally, we rule out potential confounding influ-
ences. In our setting, the main concern is that the demand shock correlates with unknown contemporaneous
improvements in the local business environment, rather than capturing a change in demand. Our estimation
strategy takes important steps to alleviate this concern by including county-year and state-year fixed effects
which eliminate most plausible sources of unobserved heterogeneity. Thus, to bias our results, any omitted
variable(s) would have to coincide with the EP Act and differentially affect the corn and wheat industries. We
therefore review a series of events that occur throughout our sample period and empirically establish whether
they confound our inferences.
VI(i). Inputs and Technology Costs
An obvious confound could be that corn producers increased other factor inputs rather than adopting SV seeds to
raise yields. The evidence in columns 1 to 5 of Table V indicates that this was not the case. Specifically, using
equation (7) we find no evidence of a significant change in the per acre capital stock, labor, fertilizer or the
incidence of productivity-enhancing irrigation technologies within the corn sector post 2005.
In column 6, we explore whether the technical change we observe in the data was due to a reduction in seed
costs. That is, adoption of stacked-varieties is driven by supply-side factors rather than from the demand side
as explained by the ethanol boom. The results in column 6 of Table V indicate this was not the case. Rather,
there are no differential trends in seed costs between the treatment and control groups post 2005. The descriptive
evidence in Appendix Table A.1 also refutes that falling technology costs drive the results. Specifically, it shows
that the real cost of SV seeds increased strongly through the sample period.23
[INSERT TABLE V AROUND HERE]
VI(ii). Falsification Tests
As an extension of the idea that there might be alternative explanations for the productivity improvements that
we observe, we conduct two falsification tests. We leverage the fact that corn is produced in Texas but producers
there did not experience a change in demand after 2005.24 Given operating conditions in Texas are similar to the
Corn Belt but the ethanol industry is essentially absent, we would expect to see productivity increases of similar
22In the model, technology adoption involves sunk costs. An alternative explanation could be that adoption is a function
of prices and the value of variable investments. In that case, one would expect to observe a reduction in the incidence of the
stacked-variety technology as prices fall following contractions in demand. On the other hand, if the sunk cost assumption
is correct, the incidence of the technology would be invariant to price changes. This is indeed the case. The data show that
relative to prices in 2008, corn prices fell in 2009 and 2010. This was not accompanied by a fall in the incidence of stacked
varieties. In 2008 50% of acres were planted using stacked variety seeds compared to 54.1% in 2009 and 55.7% in 2010.
The incidence of the technology also does not decline after 2013 when corn prices fell dramatically.
23One could argue that the main barrier to technology adoption were societal attitudes towards GE technology. For
example, consumers may be hesitant about purchasing food produced using GE seeds. The demand shock may have
alleviated this constraint because farmers could use SV seeds to supply the ethanol industry. This argument is implausible
for two reasons. First, SV seeds contain the same traits (herbicide and pesticide resistance) contained in single-gene
corn seeds that are used for food production. Second, by the end of the sample period almost 50% of planted acres used
stacked-varieties despite ethanol accounting for 35% of corn sales. It therefore seems that there were general equilibrium
effects as the demand shock led to technical change throughout the corn industry, regardless of the eventual use of corn.
24Whereas the the average operating capacity of plants within 200 miles of the average Midwestern county is 1086 mgy
the requisite figure in Texas is 14.2 mgy. Corn producers in Texas were unaffected by the ethanol boom because high
transport costs make it unfeasible to sell corn to distant ethanol plants in the Corn Belt. Historically, ethanol producers
chose not to locate in Texas due to the absence of state-level biofuel incentives, and because ethanol was not used as a
gasoline oxygenate.
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magnitude in these areas if some spurious industry trend is responsible for the observed productivity increase.
When we use the Texan sample in column 1 of Table VI the Corn-Post interaction coefficient is statistically
insignificant. The key message from this test is that productivity only increased in corn-producing areas that
were exposed to the demand shock.
[INSERT TABLE VI AROUND HERE]
Our second falsification test rules out that diverging pre-treatment productivity trends or anticipation effects
drive our findings. We restrict the sample period to 2000 to 2004 and generate a placebo treatment dummy
variable that takes the value of 1 from 2002 onward, 0 otherwise. We then interact the Corn and Placebo dummy
variables. The results of this test in column 2 of Table VI show the placebo interaction is statistically insignificant.
Hence, corn producers did not anticipate the EP Act. Corn productivity only increased following the demand
shock.
VI(iii). Other Demand Shocks
Clean identification requires that there were no coinciding changes in demand for corn from other sources
following implementation of the EP Act. We therefore append the estimating equation with interactions between
the corn dummy variable and other demand variables and report the results in columns 3 to 5 of Table VI. Despite
controlling for differential shocks to export, food and feed demand the Corn-Post coefficient remains positive,
statistically significant and comparable in magnitude to the baseline results.
Another potential concern is that the EP Act coincides with state-level bans on the use of methyl-tert
butyl ether (MTBE) following its discovery in ground water and evidence linking ingestion to carcinogenic
diseases. MTBE is a gasoline oxygenate that helps improve motor engine performance and reduces vehicle
exhaust emissions. MTBE was originally preferred to ethanol as a gasoline oxygenate because it is less prone
to spontaneous combustion. Following the state bans gasoline manufacturers switched from using MTBE to
ethanol. The overall effect of this on the level of corn demand was modest, particularly within the Corn Belt
where ethanol had historically been the preferred oxygenate (EIA [2000]). Legal challenges to the bans by
MTBE producers may explain the limited response of ethanol producers. It was only later, in 2006, that MTBE
producers were denied liability protection that ethanol became the dominant oxygenate nationwide.
To capture changes in demand for corn arising from the state-level MTBE bans we use information from the
Environmental Protection Agency to generate a dummy variable, MTBE (equals 1 if a state has banned MTBE,
0 otherwise), and interact it with the corn dummy variable. Estimates reported in column 6 of Table VI show that
our main findings are robust to this change. Interestingly, the Corn-MTBE coefficient is positive and statistically
significant. Given the MTBE demand shock was due to exogenous health concerns this permanently reinforced
corn demand. The findings therefore provide further support that increasing demand leads to productivity
improvements.
VI(iv). Additional Robustness Tests
Next, we consider whether climatic shocks drive our inferences. The results in columns 7 and 8 of Table VI
show that extreme temperature shocks and precipitation do not confound the effect of demand on productivity,
respectively.
A further concern is that there were spillover effects on the control group through general equilibrium effects.
If so, the ATEs will be spurious due to contamination of the implied counterfactual. To tackle this issue we first
use alternative control groups. Column 1 of Appendix Table A.3 reports estimation results that use barley as
the control group. Like corn, barley is a major cereal grain that can be used for animal fodder, but like wheat
it cannot be used to produce ethanol. Despite the change in counterfactual, we continue to reach the same
conclusion as before.
The second procedure we adopt uses Monte Carlo simulations to test whether wheat productivity was directly
affected by the EP Act. To implement this test we use the county-level wheat productivity data over 2000 to
2007. We randomly assign 50% of counties to placebo treatment status and the rest to control status. The placebo
treatment dummy is set equal to 1 for the years 2005 to 2007, and 0 otherwise. We then estimate the equation
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yieldit = αi +β placeboit + γt + εit , (9)
and repeat the procedure 1,000 times. As these regressions focus only on observations from the wheat industry,
they provide an indication of whether conditional on year effects, wheat yields within the county were signifi-
cantly higher during the EP Act period compared to before. Given that demand for wheat did not change we
would expect the placebo treatment dummy variable to be rejected only by chance. The rejection rates reported
in Appendix Table A.4 Panel A are consistent with this view, and indicate no spillover effects.
Next, we investigate whether reallocation of market share explains our findings. In Appendix C we use
the procedures outlined by Olley and Pakes [1996] and Combes et al. [2012] to examine the between and
within-counties effect of the demand shock on productivity growth. The evidence in Appendix Table A.5 rejects
the view that reallocation of market shares across firms in different counties drives our findings. This result is
consistent with the theory we outline below where the within effect is the driver of productivity improvements.
Finally, we examine whether our findings are driven by pro-competitive effects of changes in demand. We
interact the corn dummy with the number of firms variable and report the estimates in column 9 of Table VI. Our
key finding endures.
VI(v). Endogeneity of the EP Act and Ethanol Capacity
One could argue that lobbying affected the timing of the EP Act. It seems unlikely that atomistic Midwestern
corn farmers lobbied politicians and the patterns in contributions to the National Corn Growers Association (the
industry lobby) reported in Appendix Figure A.6 are consistent with this view. Likewise, Figure A.7 shows that
ethanol producers did not lobby politicians before 2005. In both cases, contributions are low and flat at around
$40,000 per annum between 2000 and 2005 but increase thereafter. Hence, neither corn nor ethanol producers
influenced the timing of the EP Act but once in force they were aware of its importance. Figure A.8 also reveals
that Monsanto, one of the major seed producers, did not increase lobbying before 2005. Difference-in-difference
estimations reported in Table VII also produce no evidence of significant differences in lobbying contributions
by the treatment and control groups post 2005.25
[INSERT TABLE VII AROUND HERE]
It is clear from Appendix Figure A.9 that ethanol is produced in the same areas in which corn is grown,
consistent with the importance of corn as an input in the production of ethanol. An empirical concern is that
ethanol plants’ location decisions were based on some pre-treatment trend in productivity. For example, the
location of ethanol plants could have been chosen because of some positive shock to productivity in the pre-EP
Act time period, or alternatively that ethanol producers strategically targeted sites that had large productivity
gaps relative to the yield frontier.
The agricultural economics literature suggests this was not the case and that the principle determinants of
this co-location were shipping costs, the effect that competition from other ethanol plants has on local corn
prices, and proximate markets for the sale of DDGs as an animal feed (McAloon et al. [2000]).26 We conduct a
25One could argue that the EP Act was undertaken with the goal of raising productivity within the corn sector and that
our results will be biased as a result. This does not appear plausible for two reasons. First, there is not a single mention of
the word ”corn” in the EP Act documents. Second , in unreported Cox Proportional Hazard models we find no significant
effect of corn yield on time to enactment (failure) during the years 2000 to 2005. That is, corn yields do not predict the
signing into law of the EP Act. This result holds when we expand the sample to include earlier years as well.
26Using data for ethanol plant entry for 2,979 counties over the period 1995 to 2005 Sarmiento et al. [2012] provide
evidence that the probability of a new ethanol plant locating in a county is significantly lower if that county lies within a 30
mile radius of an existing ethanol plant. By 60 miles this distance effect is close to zero. They infer from this a strong
desire to avoid competition in procurement of corn. A consequence is that most US counties contain one or no ethanol
plants. This is consistent with evidence from McNew and Griffiths [2005] who show that the opening of an ethanol plant
significantly increases corn prices only within 150 miles of the plant and Fatal and Thurman [2012] who find that local
price effects diminish to zero as the distance between the county and ethanol plant reaches 103 miles.
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similar exercise using our data period, and test the exogeneity of ethanol plant location and capacity expansions
with respect to yields within the corn sector. To examine the determinants of entry we estimate the equation
yct = γc +β1Yieldct−1 +β2Yieldct−2 +β3Out putct +β4DDGct +β5Competitorsct + γt + εct , (10)
where yct is a 0/1 indicator if at least one ethanol plant enters county c at time t. Similarly, in the capacity
expansion regressions yct is a 0/1 indicator if there is capacity under construction at an existing ethanol plant in
county c at time t. Yieldct is the productivity of corn producers in the county; Out putct is the natural logarithm
of the number of bushels of corn produced in the county; DDGct is demand for DDGs proxied by the number
of cattle on feed within a 50 mile radius of the county centroid. DDGs are the principal by-product of ethanol
production that can be used as a feedstock for farm animals. They are an important determinant of ethanol
producers profitability, accounting for between 15% and 20% of revenues (Hofstrand [2013], McAloon et al.
[2000], Sarmiento et al. [2012], USDE [2013]). Building on current evidence we construct two measures of
Competitorsct . First, the number of other ethanol firms located within a 100 (or 200) mile radius of the county;
and second, ethanol operating capacity within a 100 (or 200) mile radius of the county. These distances are
chosen as conservative estimates of the radius in which other ethanol plants are likely to have an effect on the
location of new ethanol plants found elsewhere in the literature. A full set of county γc and year γt dummies are
also included in the model. εct is the error term. We estimate equation (10) using a linear probability model due
to the inconsistency of fixed-effect probit models.
[INSERT TABLE VIII AROUND HERE]
The results of these tests are provided in Table VIII. There are three key findings, all of which are similar
to evidence already found in the literature. The behavior of ethanol plants is orthogonal to our measure of
productivity within the corn sector, yield. This is consistent with the view that we do not somehow capture
pre-treatment differences in the productivity of corn when using the ethanol capacity variable. Instead, strategic
profitability motives appear to drive location decisions. Consistent with evidence for older plants, entrants are
significantly more likely to locate in a county that is away from existing ethanol plants, or areas with low levels
of installed ethanol capacity. Entry is also more likely in counties near to DDGs markets, although the coefficient
estimate is only significant at the 10% level.
In regressions 6 to 10 of the table we repeat the exercise but investigate the determinants of capacity
expansions. Again, we fail to find corn productivity or output were determinants of capacity expansion choices.
Rather there is evidence of a positive link between DDGs demand and capacity under construction. The size and
location of ethanol plants appear therefore, to be unrelated to productivity in the corn sector.
VII. CONCLUSIONS
In this paper we analyze the link between market size, technology adoption and productivity by exploiting
exogenous variation in the demand for corn following modifications to US energy policy which triggered a sharp
increase in ethanol production, a key downstream industry for corn. Using difference-in-difference estimations
that leverage the fact that wheat is grown in close proximity to corn but is not used to manufacture ethanol we
find robust evidence that increases in demand cause firms to adopt more efficient technologies (higher quality
genetically modified seeds) leading to productivity improvements. Economically, we find that the demand shock
led physical productivity to increase by approximately 7% within the treatment group. Triple-difference models
show that within the corn industry, the extent of the productivity gains following the demand shock were larger
in areas with a higher incidence of technology adoption.
We also propose a simple model where heterogeneous firms can pay a fixed cost to obtain a more sophisti-
cated technology which allows them to produce at lower variable costs. The theory suggests that larger demand
leads to a higher share of firms adopting the better technology and, as a consequence, to higher aggregate
productivity. In the absence of technology adoption an increase in firms’ market size generates a reduction
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in average productivity as larger demand allows less productive firms to survive. Revenue-based productivity
can still potentially increase because of a more intense use of any fixed factor, but abstracting from technology
adoption a larger market does not lead to higher physical/technological efficiency. Our results provide new, much
needed evidence, and some additional insights on the important role that demand plays in motivating technology
adoption and productivity improvements.
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TABLES
Table I
Summary Statistics
Variable Observations Mean Std. Dev. Min Max Level of Aggregation Data Source
Yield 12,344 85.30 46.12 4.50 220 County NASS
Acres planted 12,344 8.44 4.73 0 13.04 County NASS
Irrigation 12,344 0.05 0.18 0 1 County NASS
Firms 12,344 0.01 0.01 0 0.16 County NASS
Ethanol capacity 12,344 1.74 13.76 0 368 County Authors’ calculations
Exports 12,344 2.15 0.26 1.75 2.60 Industry ARMS
Food 12,344 1.36 0.05 1.22 1.40 Industry ARMS
Feed 12,344 5.83 0.21 5.54 6.14 Industry ARMS
MTBE 12,344 0.09 0.28 0 1 State EIA
Extreme temperature 12,344 0.08 0.48 0 0.14 County Authors’ calculations
Precipitation 12,344 1.10 1.45 0 8.80 County Weather Underground
Output (ln) 12,344 15.49 1.47 8.70 18.16 County NASS
Entry rate 12,344 0.04 0.20 0 1 State Census
DDGs demand 12,344 0.01 0.03 0 0.66 County NASS
Plants within 100 miles 12,344 4.66 5.37 0 34 County Authors’ calculations
Plants within 200 miles 12,344 17.24 15.82 0 81 County Authors’ calculations
Capacity within 100 miles 12,344 181 239 0 1,480 County Authors’ calculations
Capacity within 200 miles 12,344 686 623 0 3,100 County Authors’ calculations
Capacity under construction 12,344 0.04 0.18 0 1 County Authors’ calculations
Entry 12,344 0.17 0.37 0 1 County Authors’ calculations
TFPQ 192 0.11 0.02 0.07 0.17 State Authors’ calculations
Land and buildings 192 49.58 16.04 15.28 91.57 State ARMS
Machinery and equipment 192 39.06 9.64 21.63 76.30 State ARMS
Labor 192 1.81 1.07 12.35 51.47 State ARMS
Fertilizer 192 31.50 9.09 12.35 51.47 State ARMS
Seed cost 192 16.72 8.74 3.18 32.05 State ARMS
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Table II
Ethanol Industry Evolution
Year Plants Net Entry (%) Capacity (mgy) Multiplant (%)
2002 56 2,240 15
2003 62 10.71 2,505 11
2004 72 16.13 2,948 10
2005 81 12.50 3,473 10
2006 107 32.10 4,052 12
2007 151 41.12 5,022 10
Notes: This table provides information on the number of ethanol plants, the net entry rate, operating capacity in the
Corn Belt (in mgy) for each year of the sample. Multiplant is the percentage of plants within the industry that belong to
a multiplant firm. The Ethanol Industry Outlook does not provide plant-level data before 2002.
19
Table III
Pre-Treatment Group Comparisons
Variable Corn Wheat Diff. Std. Error t-stat
Land and buildings 52.75 50.74 -1.80 5.76 -0.32
Machinery 39.45 39.77 0.32 2.52 0.06
Labor 1.84 1.63 -0.22 0.33 -0.66
Fertilizer 31.69 29.84 -1.85 5.11 -0.36
Seed 32.40 30.16 -2.24 1.61 1.39
Notes: This table presents the results of t-tests on the equality of input expenditure per acre between the corn and wheat
industries during 2000 to 2004.
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Table V
Input Usage and Technology Costs
Regression no. 1 2 3 4 5 6
Dependent variable Land & Mach & Labor Fertilizer Irrigation Seed
buildings equip
Corn * Post -0.0239 0.0273 0.0107 0.0050 0.0064 0.0230
(-0.90) (0.42) (0.09) (0.18) (0.17) (1.09)
State-year effects Yes Yes Yes Yes No Yes
State-industry effects Yes Yes Yes Yes No Yes
County-year effects No No No No Yes No
County-industry effects No No No No Yes No
Observations 192 192 192 192 12,404 192
R2 0.99 0.94 0.94 0.99 0.96 0.99
Notes: State-level data is used in all regressions except column 6 where county-level data is used. Standard errors are
clustered at the state level in all regressions except in column 6 where they are clustered at the county level. t-statistics
are reported in parentheses. ***, ** and * denote significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% levels.
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Table VII
Lobbying Tests
Pre-2005 Post-2005 Difference
Corn 0.0400 0.1224 0.0824
Wheat 0.1160 0.1185 -0.0025
Difference-in-difference 0.0849
(1.67)
Notes: t-statistics are reported in parentheses. ***, ** and * denote significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% levels.
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FIGURES
Figure 1
Share of US Corn Used to Produce Ethanol
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Notes: This figure plots the annual percentage of national corn production used to manufacture ethanol between 2000 and
2010. The data are taken from the USDA Feed Grains Database. The vertical line represents the beginning of 2005, the
year when the EP Act was signed into law.
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Figure 2
Productivity Evolution
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Notes: This figure plots yield per acre in natural logarithms in the corn and wheat industries during the sample period. The
vertical line represents the beginning of 2005, the year when the EP Act was signed into law.
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Figure 3
Corn Productivity Response to the Demand Shock
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Notes: This figure shows kernel density plots the distribution of yield per acre in the corn industry in 2000 and 2007.
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Figure 4
Wheat Productivity during the Sample Period
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Notes: This figure shows kernel density plots the distribution of yield per acre in the wheat industry in 2000 and 2007.
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Figure 5
Ethanol Demand and Technical Change
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Notes: This figure plots the annual change in the share of corn acres planted with SV seeds against the annual change in
ethanol capacity in each state.
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For Online Publication
Supplementary Appendix
Appendix A: Variable Definitions
Yield is the number of bushels produced per acre in industry i in county c during year t.
TFPQ is physical TFPQ in industry i in state s during year t calculated using equation (6).
Ethanol capacity is the operating capacity (in logarithms) of ethanol plants within a 200 mile radius of county c
during year t. Because The Ethanol Industry Outlook provides data on ethanol plants from 2002 onward, we use
the 2002 values for 2000 and 2001.
Firms is number of firms (in thousands) operating in industry i in county c during year t.
EPA is a dummy variable equal to 1 for the years 2005 to 2010 if an observation is from the corn industry, 0
otherwise.
Acres planted is number of acres planted in industry i in county c during year t.
Irrigation is the ratio of acres irrigated to total acres planted in industry i in county c during year t.
SV share is the ratio of acres planted using SV seed to total acres planted in industry i in county s during year t.
Irrigation is the ratio of acres irrigated to total acres planted in industry i in county c during year t.
Land & buildings is the per acre value of land and buildings (in thousands of $) in industry i in state s during
year t.
Machinery & equipment is the per acre value of machinery and equipment (in thousands of $) in industry i in
state s during year t.
Rented machinery is the per acre value of rented machinery (in thousands of $) in industry i in state s during year
t.
Labor is the per acre number of labor hours in industry i in state s during year t.
Fertilizer is the per acre value of fertilizer used in industry i in state s during year t.
SV cost is the per acre cost of SV seed (in thousands of $) used in industry i in state s during year t.
Exports is the value of exports (in logarithms) in industry i during year t.
Feed is the value of animal feed sales (in logarithms) in industry i during year t.
Food is the value of sales to the food sector (in logarithms) in industry i during year t.
MTBE is a dummy variable equal to 1 if state s has banned the use of MTBE during year t, 0 otherwise.
Banks is the number of banks operating in county c during year t.
Extreme temperature is the share of days with temperatures above the 90th percentile over the growing season c
during year t.
Precipitation is the average number of millimetres of rainfall per day over the growing season in county c during
year t.
Output is the number of bushels produced in industry i in county c during year t.
DDGs demand is proxied using the number of cattle on feed in the county (in millions) in county c during year t.
Plants within 100 (200) miles is the number of ethanol plants within a 100 (200) mile radius of the centroid of
county c during year t.
Capacity within 100 (200) miles is the capacity of ethanol plants within a 100 (200) mile radius of the centroid
of county c during year t.
Entry is a dummy variable equal to 1 if an ethanol plant enters county c during year t.
Capacity under construction is a dummy variable equal to 1 if ethanol plant capacity is under construction in
county c during year t.
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Appendix B: Tables
Table A.1 reports the real annual per acre cost of single-gene and SV seeds. All variables are deflated into 1992
US dollars using the NASS Seed Price Index. Data on seed price per acre are taken from the NASS reported in
the ”Seed Premium-Farm Income Database” held by The Organic Center.
Table A.1: Seed Cost per Acre
Year Single-Gene Stacked-Variety
2001 27.83 35.88
2002 28.80 37.94
2003 32.90 41.63
2004 37.70 50.48
2005 38.82 54.45
2006 40.37 58.14
2007 50.14 77.22
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Spillover Effects
1. Alternative Control Groups
Table A.3: Alternative Control Groups
1
Control group Barley
Corn * Post 0.1232***
(5.49)
Observations 3,379
R2 0.92
County-year effect Yes
County-industry effects Yes
Notes: The number of observations is lower compared to the baseline estimates because there are fewer counties which
grow both corn and barley during the same year. Standard errors are clustered at the county level and t-statistics are
reported in parentheses. ***, ** and * denote significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% levels.
2. Monte Carlo Simulations
Table A.4: Monte Carlo Placebo Tests
Placebo Test
Wheat Yield (Spillover Test)
Number of replications:
1,000
Rejection rate at the 1% level
(2-tailed test):
1.1%
Rejection rate at the 5% level
(2-tailed test):
5.0 %
Rejection rate at the 10% level
(2-tailed test):
10.4%
Notes: The table reports results of placebo tests. In both panels the estimating equation is yieldct = αc +βPlaceboct +
γt + εct . The placebo treatment is randomly assigned to approximately 50% of observations in the wheat sector. The
sample spans the years 2000 to 2007. The standard errors are clustered at the county level. The rejection rate is the
percentage of t-statistics that exceed the critical value at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, and denote the percentage of
times the null hypothesis, that β is equal to zero in the above equation, is rejected.
Reallocation and Selection Effects
Our findings indicate a robust increase in productivity and technology adoption within the corn sector and
suggest this stems from within-firm productivity improvements. However, reallocations of market share may
also explain the results (Asplund and Nocke, 2006).
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The county-industry structure of our data render it impossible to apply a productivity decomposition such
as that in Foster et al. (2001) to judge the relative importance of the within-firm, between-firm, entry and exit
channels to industry productivity growth. However, Olley and Pakes (1996) outline a productivity decomposition
that eschews following firms over time and instead decomposes the aggregate productivity level using
pt = p¯t +Σi∆sit∆pit (11)
= p¯t + cov(sit , pit), (12)
where ∆sit = sit − s¯it and ∆pit = pit − p¯it . pt = Σsit pit is industry productivity at time t; sit is county i’s output
market share at t; pit is county i’s productivity; p¯t and s¯t represent unweighted mean productivity and market
share, respectively.
This procedure decomposes industry productivity into a component capturing shifts in the productivity
distribution (p¯t) and another component capturing market share reallocations via the change in the covariance
component. The higher the covariance, the higher the share of output that goes to more productive counties.
We first inspect the relative importance of the two components using the county-level yield data to measure
productivity.
Panel A of Appendix Table A.5 reports the estimates of the components in equation (12). Columns 1 and
4 report share-weighted productivity, columns 2 and 5 report unweighted productivity, and columns 3 and
6 report the Olley-Pakes covariance. We find that reallocation of market share accounts for less than 20%
of aggregate industry productivity in all years. The decomposition of industry productivity also provides no
evidence of a sharp jump in the county-level covariance after the EP Act. In fact, the reverse appears to be
true and reallocations of market share become less important post 2005. We formally test this by retrieving the
annual covariance value for the corn and wheat industries and use it as the dependent variable in equation (7). In
Panel B of Table A.4 the Corn-Post interaction is statistically insignificant. The contribution of reallocations of
market share to overall corn industry productivity was therefore similar between the pre- and post-treatment
periods. In the remainder of the table we repeat the analysis using TFPQ to measure productivity. The data more
strongly refute the view that reallocation of market share explains our main results.27
Table A.5: Productivity Decomposition
Panel A: Olley Pakes (1996) Productivity Decomposition
Productivity measure Yield TFPQ
2002 1.0000 0.8125 0.1875 1.0000 0.9936 0.0064
2003 1.0624 0.8919 0.1704 1.4543 1.4535 0.0008
2004 1.1840 1.0335 0.1506 1.5097 1.5094 0.0003
2005 1.1013 0.9562 0.1451 1.4819 1.4811 0.0008
2006 1.1075 0.9582 0.1493 1.4744 1.4739 0.0005
2007 1.1218 0.9782 0.1436 1.4792 1.4788 0.0004
Panel B: Covariance difference-in-difference results
Dependent variable: Σ∆sit∆pit Yield TFPQ
Corn 0.0651*** -0.0024
(2.93) (-0.60)
Corn * Post -0.0344 -0.0001
(-0.74) (-0.05)
Observations 16 16
R2 0.96 0.92
Year effects Yes Yes
Notes: Panel A reports the individual components of the Olley and Pakes (1996) productivity decomposition. Panel B
reports difference-in-difference estimates of equation (7) using the annual covariance term as the dependent variable.
Standard errors are clustered at the year level and the corresponding t-statistics are reported in parentheses.
27This conclusion is unchanged when we use acres planted to measure market share.
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Finally, we use the method proposed by Combes et al. (2012) to isolate to what extent firm selection explains
changes in the distribution of corn yields over time. In their model, stronger selection leads to left truncation of
the productivity distribution. Using the distribution of corn yields before and after the EP Act, the results in
Table A.6 show that the truncation parameter is statistically insignificant. Hence, the increase in productivity
within the corn sector is not driven by selection effects. Rather, as Table A.6 shows, the increase was driven
by a large and statistically significant shift in the productivity distribution, consistent with improvements to
within-firm productivity.
Table A.6: Selection Effects
Shift Dilation Truncation
Coefficient 0.1401*** 0.0277** -0.0001
z-statistic 6.70 2.03 -0.03
Notes: ***, and ** indicate statistical significance at the 1% and 5% levels, respectively.
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Appendix C: Figures
Figure A.1: Ethanol Plant Location
Plant
No plant
A: 2002
B: 2007
Notes: This figure plots the location of ethanol plants in the continental US for the years 2002 (Panel A) and 2007 (Panel
B). Only ethanol plants that use corn as their feedstock are shown.
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Figure A.2: Ethanol Production, Consumption and Imports
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Notes: This figure reports the number of gallons of ethanol produced, consumed and imported by the US. Data are taken
from the 2011 EIA Annual Energy Review, Table 10.3. The vertical line represents the beginning of 2005, the year when
the EP Act was signed into law.
Figure A.3: Sources of Corn Demand
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Notes: This figure plots the annual number of bushels of corn purchased for use in the ethanol industry and by other sectors
(exports, feed, food and seed) between 2002 and 2010. The data are taken from the USDA Economic Feed Grains Database,
Table 2. The vertical line represents the beginning of 2005, the year when the EP Act was signed into law.
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Figure A.4: Productivity Evolution Controlling for Time Effects
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Figure A.4 reports the distribution of corn yield in 2000 and 2010 taking into account year effects. Specifi-
cally, we estimate the equation
yieldit = α+ γt + εit (13)
where γt represent year fixed effects. We then use the residuals from this regression to plot Figure A.4.
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Figure A.5 Stacked Variety Share of Acres
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Notes: This figure plots the annual percentage of corn acres planted using SV seeds in each state within our sample. Years
are plotted on the x-axis in all panels and the percentage of acres planted using SV seeds is on the y-axis. The labels above
each panel indicate which state the data relate to.
Figure A.6: National Corn Growers Association Contributions
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Notes: This figure plots annual contributions to the National Corn Growers Association during the sample period. All data
are taken from http://www.opensecrets.org. The vertical line represents the beginning of 2005, the year when the EP Act
was signed into law.
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Figure A.7: Ethanol Lobbying Expenditure
50
10
0
15
0
20
0
25
0
Lo
bb
yin
g 
Ex
pe
nd
itu
re
 ($
'00
0)
2002 2004 2006 2008 2010
Year
Notes: This figure plots annual lobbying expenditure by the American Coalition for Ethanol during the sample period. All
data are taken from http://www.opensecrets.org. No lobbying contributions are reported before 2002. The vertical line
represents the beginning of 2005, the year when the EP Act was signed into law.
Figure A.8: Monsanto Lobbying Expenditure
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Notes: This figure plots annual lobbying expenditure by Monsanto Corporation during the sample period. All data are
taken from http://www.opensecrets.org. The vertical line represents the beginning of 2005, the year when the EP Act was
signed into law.
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Figure A.9: Average Planted Acres of Corn 2000-2007
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Notes: This figure plots the average annual number of planted corn acres of corn in each county during the sample period
2000 to 2007.
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